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Abstract 
 
Going public often represents a challenge for most companies. Unit-IPOs seem to 
stretch a unique ability to improve investors' confidence offering a ‘sweeten to the deal’ 
(Schultz, 1993). Nonetheless, in a full information setting that should not matter 
(Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1997). Warrants fundamental roll in IPOs didn’t yet find a 
consensus in the literature. The main purpose of this thesis is to test if these units are 
implemented as a substitution of other governance mechanisms or if they are used by 
already well managed companies who try to signal their IPO quality. Studying their 
governance structure and their individual traits, one should be able to gain additional 
knowledge to answer the question. The empirical findings, on this thesis, pointed to 
smaller and riskier companies as main issuers of unit offers. Whereas, they display 
weaker governance mechanisms ex-ante bid. However, when equating them with equity-
only offers, they don’t appear to underperform. Supporting Schultz (1993) Agency-cost 
theory and adding to the current literature a new spectrum from US IPOs, with a time 
range between 2007 and 2017, that to our current knowledge have not been yet focus of 
study.  
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Resumo 
  
 As Ofertas Públicas Iniciais representam, de forma frequente, um desafio para a 
maioria das empresas. Ofertas iniciais com emissão de unidades apresentam uma 
habilidade única para ‘adoçar o negocio’ (Schultz, 1993). No entanto, num cenário onde 
existe uma dispersão total de informação, essa adição não deveria ser relevante 
(Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1997).  
O papel fundamental de títulos de garantias em IPOs parece ainda não ter encontrado 
consenso na literatura. O objetivo desta tese é aferir se este mecanismo é implementado 
como alternativa ao uso de outros instrumentos de governança corporativa ou se em 
contraste é usado por companhias com boa gestão que tencionam sinalizar a sua 
qualidade. Com o teste das suas estruturas de governança, este estudo será capaz de 
responder às anteriores questões. Os resultados empíricos, desta tese, descrevem as 
empresas emissoras de unidades como menores e com um maior índice de risco 
associado. Revelam ainda que os mecanismos de governança utilizados são fracos ex-
ante oferta. No entanto, quando equacionamos estas empresas com as que apenas 
emitiram ações, as primeiras não demonstram qualquer perda de desempenho 
relativamente às empresas de emissão única. Suportando assim a Teoria de Custos de 
Agência, Schultz (1993), e adicionando à literatura corrente, uma base empírica relativa 
a ofertas nos Estados Unidos da América, entre os anos 2007 e 2017, que perante o nosso 
atual conhecimento ainda não foi alvo de análise. 
Palavras-Chave: Ofertas Iniciais Unitárias, Títulos de Garantia, Estrutura 
Governamental, Custos de Agência, Hipótese de Sinalização 
Classificação JEL: G34 
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Chapter 1 
 
I Introduction 
 
 
The main intention of this research is the study of the inclusion of warrants in 
Initial Public Offerings in the United States of America. 
Why do firms include warrants in their IPOs? There are currently two theories 
who divide the academic community on the subject. In one side, the Agency Cost theory 
formulated by Schultz (1993), that succinctly states that companies with greater agency 
problems tend to choose unit IPOs, arguing that they are used as governance 
mechanisms. In contrast, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) Signalling Hypothesis claims 
that high-quality firms include these financial instruments in the offering to distinguish 
themselves from low-quality firms, affirming that firms who comprise units are trying to 
signal the quality of their firm and consequently are already well managed. Among the 
many supporters of Schultz theory (1993), there can be found numerous empirical proofs 
related to the efficiency of units as governance regulators, the core idea takes its position 
on the availability of cash-flows. As Michael C. Jensen (1986) remarks, managers tend 
to invest badly when they have excess of free cash-flows. Unit IPOs can work as a 
‘staged financing’ similar to what happens with Venture Capitals, restricting the free 
cash-flow problem.  
As stated by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997), their hypothesis didn’t intend to be a 
direct confrontation to Schultz theory, focusing on the signalling dynamics and relying in 
Leland and Pyle (1977) previous models. Nonetheless, the subsequent literature faced 
both theories to each other as if they were in a dispute, making them the most accepted in 
the field.  
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Although IPOs are a well-studied realm in the field of Finance, unit offerings are 
less explored and crowded with unanswered gaps. Some studies such as Zhang (2010), 
Howe and Olsen (2009) and How et al. (2001) provided several arguments to fill some 
of them. This thesis aims to do the same, with an introspective analysis on the companies 
who emit package offers. Concretely, this study will cover a period of the past 10 years 
on the NYSE and NASDAQ markets.  
Moreover, the true motivation behind the emission of such financial instruments is not 
the only question who have not yet found consensus, the performance of this IPO scheme 
is also debatable. Do unit IPOs underperform shares-only Offerings? This research 
eagers to add further information to answer the former question, enlarged with 
supplementary investigation on the frequency of these type of IPO: Are they more 
common in bear or bull markets? 
In line with the previous, this thesis will display evidences that support Schultz 
(1993) Agency Cost Theory, with strong indicators to the higher performance of equity-
only emissions and the non-existence of unit-offers in bear-markets.  
The present report shall diverge from the prior literature as the following: First, in 
the time scope. Whereas to our current knowledge, no previous published paper examined 
this offer type between 2007 and 2017 for the aforementioned US markets. Furthermore, 
the introduction of the Energy SIC, as a proxy for volatility but more importantly as an 
implementation of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) theoretical imagined unit company 
that intends to signal its quality. Lastly, the analysis of the delisted companies by year, 
shall bring additional information about the behaviours of such offers in different market 
conditions. 
Besides this section, this report is divided in: Section 2, consisting with the 
relevant literature review, exposing the main theories and authors’ insights; Section 3, 
describing the hypotheses to be empirical tested; Section 4, explaining the methodology 
to test the hypothesis; Section 5, presents the models and the respectively interpretations 
and Section 6, presenting the conclusions. Moreover, the annexes, include a section 
dedicated to the Energy SIC, a comprehensive table with variables correlations, the 
frequency of returns of both offers types and two additional Probit models.       
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Chapter 2 
 
II  Literature Review  
 
 
Before connecting the main theories to be study with the empirical data, is 
fundamental to understand how units fundamentally work and how does the different 
types of offer, defined in different stages of the company life, can influence their 
behaviour. In order to preserve additional context, this thesis will also provide the basic 
definitions of offer types and dive into the surface of important corporate governance 
structures.  
 
2.1 IPO 
  
An Initial Public Offering is understood as the first offer on the primary stock 
market. Although, there are also structures who allow debt initial offerings and other 
types of deals, the focus of this thesis will be solely about equity sales, therefore any 
reference of IPO will only regard equity offerings. On a simplistic definition, is the first 
sale of the company shares where any outside investors can enter in the trade.  
When a private company requires additional capital, to maintain or increase a 
certain level of growth, many instruments are available to help. Debt is usually the first 
one to be chosen, ranging from short term commercial papers to long-terms bond 
emissions. This type of financing is seen by many as the primary source of capital, some 
even argue about the positive impact of the debt in the corporate governance of the 
company. Black and Gilson (1998) states that the increment of debt works as an incentive 
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to the managers. So, why do companies decide to go public? Why managers decide to 
lose part of the company ownership to raise capital?  
As empirically shown by J. R. Ritter and Welch (2002), companies seem to engage in 
their IPO after a certain stage of their life-cycle and if the market conditions are 
favourable to the issue. Encompassed with the du 
Moreover, when a company is backed by a Venture Capital there’s also an additional 
pressure from their side, since the usual behaviour of a VC is to avoid unnecessary long-
term investments, trying to exit through an IPO as soon as possible. Closing their position 
and distributing the profit by their own share-holders.  
On the other hand, going public can a risky manoeuvre, the costs of going public 
can be very lofty, conforming to J. Ritter (1998), there are two types of costs: direct and 
indirect. The former, encompass the bureaucratic expenses overdue by the regulators, 
underwriter fees and any other expenditures related to the process itself. The indirect 
costs include can be inputted into different fronts. First, the costs to the current 
shareholders who will suffer a potential loss of control due to the share dilution. Second, 
for both the company and the investors, the fluctuation on the valuations can be very 
harmful, leaving the current shareholders in the hands of the market. Furthermore, the 
aggressive take-overs are usually the main concern of the managers. Often used to share 
their ownership with trustful investors and Venture Capitals who shared the same goals 
than them, now they are face with threatening competitors who are hungering to take a 
competitive advantage, sometimes translated by unwanted take-overs. In addition, 
there’s also the increased probability of losing sensitive information to this competition, 
not only by the required discloser of information required by the regulators, but also by 
scrutiny of the many more financial followers who know have incentives to close 
monitor the company. 
The first step for the company, who wish to go public, is to find an underwriter. 
The theoretical concept of underwriting is no more that the intermediation between the 
issuer and the public who will take the part on the transaction. Usually, this process is 
shaped by highly reputed investment banks. Nonetheless, there are other factor beside 
the reputation. Industry awareness is sometimes chosen over the latter. Moreover, the 
financial institution will help the company to complete a series of actions, some with 
legal character others related to all the marketing evolving the auction. Moreover, the 
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agreement between both parts can take different boundaries. Conventionally, firms enrol 
in one of the following deal types: Firm-commitment, Best effort agreement or Syndicate 
of Underwriters (Smith, 2003). 
Commonly recognized as one of the most employed methods, firm-commitments are 
based on the underwriter wiliness to buy all the shares and take full responsibility to sell 
them on the market. As stated by Smith (2003, p. 208), “A firm commitment is like money 
in the bank…”. Although it’s true that the underwriter accepts most of the risk, this type 
of deal is often backed by investors who already made written agreements with the 
underwriter, avoiding potential losses.  
Differently, in a best effort agreement the financial institution doesn’t give any guarantees 
regarding the output of the offer, in an oversimplified way, it only sells the shares to the 
interested buyers.  
After the offer type is settled, the underwriter needs to complete a series of legal and 
bureaucratic processes, that in many devolved markets counts with engagement letters, 
letter of intent, underwriting agreement, registration statement, red herring documents, 
prospectus, and many others. 
The regulatory approval allows the issue to proceed to the next stage and thereafter to the 
final price and number of shares to be allotted. Nonetheless, the previous step is often the 
spotlight of one of the most studied characteristics of IPOs: under-pricing. Although 
underwriters are “usual players” in the market and have all the incentives to correctly set 
the prices according all the available information, they repeatedly under-price IPOs.  
(Roosenboom, 2012).  
Some of the most accepted explanatory models stand on the presence of 
asymmetric information. Although underwriters and issuers work to the same goal, the 
IPO success, they also take into consideration their own utility maximization. In another 
words, it can be advantageous to the underwriters to reduce the price in a past offer to 
increase the buyers’ fidelity and trust on them. Furthermore, the same picture can be 
painted for the issuers, who’s taking into consideration a possible future offering 
(Seasoned offering / Follow on). 
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2.2  Unit IPOS 
 
Among the many definitions of unit IPOS, the humblest description explains 
them as an offering that contains a package of stocks and warrants. Although it can 
be globally recognized by the former terminology, some better know them by PIPOs, 
‘Package IPOs’ (How et al., 2001). 
Unit IPO’s started to have a greater connotation in the earlies of twentieth 
century. Companies realized that the inclusion of instruments like warrants, could 
‘sweeten’ the deal of their first offerings. Giving away an extra part of their ownership, 
the company could offer an apparently more profitable arrangement to outsider investors. 
However, the strategy rose opposing questions about it.  
When all information is available on the market and a ‘full information setting’ 
is observed, there’s no justification for the usage of these instruments. The market should 
assess the fundamental value of the IPO without the inference of an overvaluation due 
to the usage of warrants. Nevertheless, some companies still emit them. To answer this 
paradox, some literature (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1997) argue that when full market 
efficiency is not present, these mechanisms can be used for different purposes, as its 
proposed by the Agency Theory and the Signalling Hypothesis.    
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2.3  Warrants  
 
One of the first written definitions of warrants comes from Fried (1960), 
defining them as endowments to its owner who grant the right but not the obligation to 
convert them into a common stock in a pre-defined proportion and with a specified strike 
price, with or without time range as a constraint. In his approach the author reveals them 
as a unique tool of speculation, as the book title suggests. Although they work much as 
call options as stated by Galai and Schneller (1978), being integrally a derivative upon 
the firm stock price, they have some fundamental particularities that make them an 
exceptional financial tool used in a variety of branches from risk management to 
speculative actions. According Abinzano and Navas (2013) these instruments mainly 
take two forms: Covered warrants or corporate warrants. When comparing the latter, the 
focus of this research, with standard call options two major differences should be 
highlighted, the issuer and their convertibility process. In warrants we have as the issuer 
the firms themselves who ascribe the peculiarity of its convertibility, while call options 
are exercised in exchange of a stock who’s already marketable, when a warrant is 
exercised a new issue takes place, in other words the company issue a new stock to fulfil 
its part of the agreement.  
Although these instruments are largely used and valued by practitioners, some 
may argue that they are neglected by the literature when equating with other financial 
derivatives. Nonetheless, there’s still a considerable demand for them, where different 
types of innovations have flown this market.  
W.-G. Zhang, Xiao and He (2009) warrants into two main categories: American and 
European. Like other derivatives, these types depend on the exercise time, they can 
additionally be divided in call warrants or put warrants. Moreover, the issuer can also 
derive. Although the main characteristic of these instruments is apparently funding the 
firm operations, there are warrants that do not fulfil that goal. Unusually they can be 
separated into other smaller subgroups, mentioned before, such as corporate (equity) 
warrants or covered warrants.  
Being the latter allotted by third parties, for instance banks or other financial institutions. 
Warrants scope can seem already wide, but financial innovations are constantly 
happening, and covered warrants can be even more delimited by new introductions such 
as turbo warrants. 
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2.4 Corporate Governance  
 
For years academics are trying to understand the internal mechanisms that distinguish a 
well-managed company from a company with internal problems. Furthermore, from the 
investor's perspective is also fundamental to recognize the two types of company’s ex-
ante investment. Many researches understand that the key point to categorize them start 
in the board of the company. Thus, is essential to understand the board role in a company 
performance. Although the topic is broader that what this thesis can address, some key 
concepts, from multiple authors, will be discussed being vital to the development of the 
main theories analysed in this investigation. 
 
2.4.1 Board role and CEO Duality  
  
 Every public company has a board. More than a formal and legal requirement, 
having a board can be compared as having a pillar who sustains a building, the pressure 
exercised in the pillar may vary from building to building, but nonetheless is essential to 
the stability of the same. Boards have been extensively studied for more than one century, 
albeit the broader knowledge surrounding the topic the optimum board layout can still be 
debatable. Nevertheless, its role is clear, work as the last instance of the power in any 
company.  
When examining a board structure, one question may arise, who should lead this ultimate 
mechanism of governance? Classically the common thought can acknowledge the CEO 
as the perfect contestant, however the financial literature may disagree. Quoting Fama 
and Jensen (1983): 
“The decision processes of some open corporations seem to be dominated by an 
individual manager, generally the chief executive officer. In some cases, this signals the 
absence of separation of decision management and decision control, and, in our theory, 
the organization suffers in the competition for survival.” 
Ceo duality is understood as the conduction of multiple roles by the Chief Executive 
Officer of the company, specifically his role as chairman of the board. The opposite, 
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where two different people exercise the positions, is recognized as an independent 
structure.  
According Rechner and Dalton (1991), this double position can condition the 
board main purpose: ‘monitor the performance of the top management’. Companies with 
CEO duality are usually more inflexible and restrain the board ability to performe an 
efficient corporate governance. Picturing this behaviour as ineffective, the authors 
assessed the impact of the two management styles and predicted what would be the 
optimum leadership separation between the production side of a company and the 
company goals. 
Other literature, as Boyd (1995), aligned its empirical research with Jensen’s agency 
problems theory, where an agent the (CEO) has conflict of interests with a second party 
(shareholders), Boyd (1995)  defends that when the major decision maker (chairman) has 
his goals not aligned with the shareholders' interests, as most CEOs don’t own the 
majority of the firm's capital, there are very strong incentives for the CEO to try to 
maximize his wealth forfeiting the stakeholders interests or simply to minimize his own 
risk. 
Therefore, is easy to picture that many governance decisions can become to be biased, 
not only because of the many incentives that the CEOs gain with this dual position, but 
also as result of the increase number of disagreements that can arise from the extreme 
concentration of power, not only in the board but in the company itself.  
In their empirical finding, Rechner and Dalton (1991), examined a sample of 141 public 
US companies, reaching the astonish number of 78.7 percent elections for duality. 
Although the trend seems to be fading, as result of multiple criticisms by the medias and 
by the relentless pressure for the perfect board structure, sided by the increased 
requirements from SEC. Furthermore, previous researches such as Boyd, connected 
directly this behaviour with company’s low performance, notwithstanding, the results 
were not statistically significant for every scenario, opening space to some interesting 
considerations to the fact that different levels of uncertainty may lead to different results. 
Meaning, that perhaps there may be times, in the life of a company, where this duality 
can in fact be beneficial.  
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2.4.2 Board Size, Independence and Debt 
 
 In concordance with the previous literature, the board size and board 
independence are intrinsically connected with the firm performance. Kang (2007), Bhagat 
(2001), Guest (2009). Although, there may be a lack of congruence on the behaviour of 
each factor, contrasting when environmental variables or frameworks are changed. 
There’s a consensus when it comes to their relevance. 
 The long-studied relation between board size - firms’ performance, is generally 
accepted by the literature as inversely proportional when controlled by sized. Jensen 
(1993), described the scenario of disagreement inside a large board, as result of loss of 
efficiency and discoordination.   
Further, Guest (2009), defined the relationship as negative correlated, after analysing a 
set of 2,746 British companies. In a different setting, Eisenberg (1998), analysed a sample 
of small 900 Finnish companies. Moving from the large Cap firms and the US 
environment. The authors’ study presented evidences of a board-size effect. The results 
pointed for the dependent relation between firm size and board size.  
 In contradiction, the board independence, is commonly accepted as a fundamental 
requirement for an efficient board. More than a necessary manoeuvre to control the CEO, 
as suggested by Bhagat (2001). It’s important to improve the communication and to 
spread new ideas across the members (Kang, 2007). 
 Lastly, the presence of debt is recognized by Jensen & Meckling (1976) as 
substantially important when accessing the optimal capital structure. Working as an 
additional monitoring mechanism, who promotes the reduction of agency costs.  Its effect 
is based on a double effect, that thrives from the assumption that the increase of debt, also 
increases managers pressure and incentives to reduce any Agency Costs present on the 
firm. Moreover, the monitoring role of the creditor, who wish to secure the investment, 
also appears to be relevant in Datta (1999) empirical findings.  
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2.5 Agency Cost Hypothesis  
 
The Agency Cost hypothesis, proposed firstly by Schultz (1993), sought to 
bring a new light to the forgotten realm of unit IPOs. Its main goal was to understand the 
relation between the quality of a firm and the issue of warrants. Although some previous 
studies about the subject were made, such as Fried (1960), until the authors’ publication 
unit IPOs were a specie of guarantee to make investors safely invest in a higher length 
on their risk aversion horizon. The author characterized the issuers of these offerings as 
small, young and light assets companies, with a focus in the tech and service sector. 
Schultz divided his research in three main different points: The cost of going 
public through unit IPOs; The Agency costs related with unit issues; The survival rates 
of these unit companies.  
When assessing the cost of going public the author compared a sample of 630 
companies who only emitted shares and 167 firms who went public with warrants 
emissions, from a period from 1986 to 1988. The findings, as Schultz had previously 
hypothesized, remitted to a higher cost of unit initial offerings when equated with 
comparable share only offerings. Moreover, the results pointed to even higher costs when 
nonaccountable expenses allowances were included. In order to justify his results, the 
author connects the risk bearded by the underwriter when issuing units with this higher 
cost, since the success of such offerings are usually lower.  
In a broader approach, Dunbar (1995), makes an interesting linkage amid the 
reimbursement method and the costs associated with the unit IPOs. Backed by empirical 
data he unveils that using warrants as compensation reduce significantly the costs 
demanded by the financial institution, arguing that this miscalculation of the 
expenditures is due to a bad estimation, from the underwriter, who don’t force firms to 
take the more expensive compensation contracts. Other literature such as (Barry, 
Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1991), had already hypothesized that warrants offerings do 
cause greater under-pricing when compared with issues without warrants, making them 
costlier to the issuer, reporting that although there are riskier they could also help to 
reduce the information asymmetry by tying the underwriter compensations to future 
price performance. 
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The second point covered by the Agency Cost theory regards the choice of 
offering type and how it influences the costs brought up by an inefficient manager. Going 
public is a big step in a company life and can sometimes dictates its success or failure, 
aligned with the quality of the management to correctly invest the funds gathered by the 
issue, it can be stated that they are the foundations of the firm future. Schultz provides 
empirical data to support his theory: “…unit IPOs are used to minimize the agency costs 
of free cash flows when it is difficult to determine whether a firm has worthwhile 
projects.” (Schultz, 1993). This is true specially when the current equity is already 
diversified by external investor that have no managerial positions in the firm. 
Furthermore, when firm performance turns out to be bad and composed by unprofitable 
projects, managers have extra incentives to incur in agency costs, investing in weak 
projects, with negative NPV. Units issues can be used as a tool to fight this problem since 
the investment is staged, like what happen in a venture capital funding, managers don’t 
have the total amount of cash available at one time, only if they prove the market the 
firms value they will be able to access the other portion of the capital. The latter creates 
a security line against bad managerial practices, limiting the potential amount of losses. 
Essentially, this type of offering allows that the funding generated by the units, such as 
warrants, can be used only if they are really necessary or in a notional connotation if the 
company grown enough to access them. Furthermore, Byoun (2004) also points to the 
fact that the high-performance companies will have a lower probability to need to 
assemble a future Seasoned Issue. When a company keeps growing, the corresponding 
share price is usually following the trend, approaching the threshold to exercise the 
warrant, this means additional funding for the Unit IPO company.  
“The most efficient corporate governance structure will vary by firm depending 
on the costs and benefits of different governance mechanisms. For IPO firms, warrants 
might act as a substitute for other governance mechanisms” (Schultz, 1993).  
As an inference for the previous point, it’s fair to reason that unit offerings have 
a higher probability to fail than share only IPOs. The fact that the market needs to 
validate the quality of the firm, delaying the full investment, makes weak firms fails 
earlier. In other words, while in a share only offer, a bad firm can access instantly a 
higher amount of funds postponing its failure with different and more expensive projects. 
In a unit offering only the most adapted firms who can fulfil the market expectations can 
survive. Specifically, the second round of investment can only exist if the initial stage is 
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lucrative to the investors, only when the project is valuable, and the stock price exceeds 
the warrant exercise price.  
As a last empirical key point, Schultz paper adds the failure likelihood for each 
category of IPO, confirming the implicit reasoning that unit offerings have a higher 
probability to fail than share only IPOs. It’s important to highlight that adjustments to 
the offer size, firm age, offering returns and underwriter prestige were made.  
 
2.5.1 Limitations 
 
Although Schultz (1993) theory was an entry door to the study of unit IPOs, some authors 
such as Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) and Zhang (2010) claimed that his research has 
some dubious points.  
The main argument describing that companies adopt unit IPOs to diminish agency costs, 
through the shrink of available cash-flows, can be brought to reasoning. According 
Michael C. Jensen (1986), managers tend to have incentives to surpass the company's 
optimal growth point. In a blunt form, since their remunerations are intrinsically 
connected with the firm’s development, they strive to achieve maximum fruition and 
performance. Nonetheless, the connection with excessive investment can lead to 
unsustainable growth or even worse to bad investments.     
 This condition can affect all companies. If unit-IPOs were the solution to the latest 
problem, not only small and young companies would issue Unit-IPOs. In another words, 
its popularity among other type of companies would be greater, at least some tendency 
would be spotted by the academics. But then again, for Byoun (2004), the propensities 
are completely the reversed. The number of unit-IPOs has been decreasing.  
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2.6  Signalling Hypothesis 
 
According Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency relationships can be defined as 
interactions between two or more parties, who have as goal the maximization of their 
utility regarding a specific interaction. Consequently, one party can have divergent 
ambitions from the synergy, leading to contrasting actions and therefore costs to one of 
the actors, usually the investors of the project or company. Following the idea that 
agency costs can be in fact a constraint when entrepreneurs try to get external financing, 
connecting with the vast literature about IPOs, Leland and Pyle (1977) explain the non-
consensual under-pricing in this first offerings. Amid the massive theories about the 
topic, their signalling hypothesis propose that managers from good and effective 
companies use two main tools to distinguish themselves from inferior companies, who 
try to mimic their quality to attain higher funding.  
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) differentiate their model apart from the 
previous signalling hypothesis by two main factors. First, the authors exclude the 
previous literature constraints relating the premise that companies only signal their IPOs 
when strategizing a Seasoned Offering. Although their model can in fact be applied in 
these conditions, it’s not mandatory that the existence of a second offering. Furthermore, 
the second variance from prior works stands on the inclusion of a package offering to 
entrepreneurs sign higher firm value.   
The model presents two different companies: Company G and Company B. 
 The former, defines a good company with high expected future cash flows, with 
undefined risk. The latter defines the contrast, a bad company, with lower expected cash 
flows and subsequently a minor potential Firm Value. Moreover, it’s assumed an 
environment of uncertainty where asymmetric information is present, to distinguish the 
parties the authors define the insiders as knowledgeable and outsiders as risk-takers.  
The first category has all the information about the company, from the expected future 
cash-flows to the risk of the firm, nonetheless they still brace a level of uncertainty, since 
there’s different probabilities for the different cash flows stages, the project performance 
can be very good, leading the company to an high stage, a medium and low are also 
possible with their designated probabilities that are also present in the model, in another 
words the insiders also have some degree of uncertainty regarding to how well will the 
project perform.  
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An important assumption concerning the insiders is that they are risk averse, in 
other words they don’t want to incur in any type of unnecessary risk.  The second group 
are the outsiders, who can only assess information like the risk of the firm by the 
availability of public information. 
According Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) model, when modelling the 
problem in a free asymmetric information environment, there’s no point to issue 
warrants. It’s assumed that, both companies will disclose their true value, letting know 
the investors which company has the higher benefits, creating a pointless need to insiders 
signal their value and consequently the usage of units or any other signalling object.  
“In the full information setting, insiders, being risk averse, choose to divest 
their equity holdings in the firm completely, since the time 1 value of the firm is uncertain. 
There is no reason for issuing warrants in the absence of asymmetric information.” 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997, p. 9). 
In an asymmetric information scenario on the other hand the good firms, as 
Leland and Pyle hypothesized, will try to prove their value, trying to separate themselves 
from the bad firms, in order to do so three tools may be used: under-pricing, ownership 
retention and unit's emission. Simultaneously the B firms will try to ‘mimic’ the high 
value competitor, to get further financing, disguising as good firms and copying all the 
signals emitted from the rivals. Nonetheless the authors defined that they can only mimic 
to a certain extent, after some point it becomes too expensive to continue this artificial 
look.  
Furthermore, authors archetypal is based in separating sequential equilibria, 
brought up by Kreps and Wilson (1982), who himself derives his model from previous 
literature, such as Nash equilibrium in order to enlighten the game theory. Following the 
conditions that both players follow a ‘sequential rationality’, where they both line their 
strategy with the unobservable choices made by the other party. The separating equilibria 
took (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1997) model to a new assumption. Outsiders reactions 
to any move of the companies are identified, leading to a conservation of funds from the 
company G. In a different preposition, this company doesn’t need to invest unnecessary 
money to signal their quality, when the optimal level is reached, to assure the 
differentiation, the outsiders will know. That being said, it’s also useful to take in 
consideration the emission’s cost for both companies. While the company G is 
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calculating the units exercise price accordingly to its future expected returns, the B 
competitor is not. Since we have a proportionality between the ratio of warrants / stocks 
to its cost, it will be easier to the former company to increase this ratio. Meaning that 
company G is depending in its fundamentals and will have a higher probability to cover 
the unit's costs and reach a second stage of financing. 
After the modulation of various scenarios, the authors arrived at several 
conclusions. First, when comparing firms apparently equal before the IPO, it’s possible 
to assess that the riskier companies will emit their offer under-priced or/and will include 
warrants in it. In contrast, less volatile firms (with less risky future expected cash-flows) 
will emit share-only offers, nevertheless they will signal their quality with an under-
priced value. Second, while comparing the different signalling options, Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri (1997), related them with the level of riskiness of the companies. Firms who 
used under-priced and emission of units will have a positive relation with firm riskiness, 
particularly the higher the under-pricing or higher the ratio of warrants/stocks, the higher 
will be the company risk. In dissimilarity, companies who retain ownership instead, 
should have an inversely relationship between this signal mechanism and the firm 
riskiness, in other words, the bigger the fraction retained by the insiders, the less risky is 
the firm. Finally, they claim that under-pricing can be a ‘optimization strategy’ to 
insiders achieve a higher personal utility. Within a trade-off between the fraction of 
ownership they want to keep and the signal they want to emit to the investors.  
 As final conclusion, the authors defend that units don’t seem to be solely used to 
decrease agency costs. Companies type G, who are already well managed (with high 
expected cash flows), but also have high expected volatility are specially interested in 
signal their quality. Let us take a practical example. Two competitor companies who 
started on the tech business, one with strong fundamentals, the other with a weak business 
model and low expected cash-flows. Both will face a risky environment due to the 
complexity of the tech industry, except they have completely different rates of success 
that are yet to be proven in the market. The company with the higher expected cash flows 
have all the incentives to signal their quality with a future commitment to the investors 
(units' emission). On the other hand, the weak competitor will try to mimic this 
commitment, knowing they have lower probabilities to fulfil it. They will both emit units, 
independently of the firm management quality. On the other side, let us picture a firm 
with the same expected cash flows that the G firm of the last example, but in a more 
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mature industry such as retail, with a constant progression of return (low volatility). 
Although they share the same mean returns, the volatility will play a crucial role, the retail 
company can predict when they will be able to access these cash flows, in contrast the 
tech company are fastened to a roller-coaster of cash-flows, having the extra need to 
assure an optimal financing in its IPO and consequently the usage of units.  
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Chapter 3 
 
III Empirical study 
 
 
3.1 Hypothesis  
 
As implied from the previous literature, it can be argued there are several gaps 
and lack of empirical researches relating units and their impact on company’s corporate 
governance. The main goal of this research is to collect additional evidences about the 
topic. Filling slightly the void with an empirical analysis of unit IPOs.  
Primarily the hypothesis to be tested stands on the premise that units are a substitute to 
other governance mechanisms. In a more detailed line, the goal of this study is to analyse 
if Schultz (1993) was right when he stated that warrants reduce agency costs. Therefore, 
test if they are employed as a complementary piece of a well-structured Corporate 
Governance dynamic, acting as alternatives to other mechanisms. Or, if in contrast, they 
are used to signal IPOs quality, as theorized by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997). In the 
latter case, it could signify that firms are already well managed, and the peculiar offer is 
employed as a technique to distinguish the good company from its less worthy 
competitors.  
To reach a conclusion, the hypothesis should investigate the elements who reduce agency 
costs, explicitly the companies’ governance structure. By evaluating the latter, we can 
define if unit companies are more efficient after their issue.  
Secondarily, the research can also implicitly answer two additional questions: does unit 
offerings outperform the comparable share-only IPOs?  
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The latest, can provide additional arguments about the efficiency of these offers and 
about the companies who cast them off. In another words, it may provide supplementary 
clues about their real fundamental value and future cash-flows. 
Although, that’s not the focus of this research, this comparison can be in deed useful to 
establish a connection point between the IPO success and the management performance. 
Moreover, it can be helpful when establishing a relation between the firm riskiness and 
the usage of these instruments.  
The foundations of this research stand on other studies who employed the same 
hypothesis as a driver. Howe and Olsen (2001) investigation collected data from 1996 to 
2004 and found out that unit IPOs can indeed decrease agency costs created by available 
free cash flows of the company. Expanding the analysis from the previous work of Howe 
in 2001, where they essentially analysed the same hypothesis in a different set, namely 
in Australia, with a sample 134-unit offerings. 
The hypotheses enumeration will progress as follows: 
H1: Unit companies are smaller and risker. 
H2: Share-Only companies have better corporate governance mechanisms in place before 
IPO. 
H3: Units-Offers are used as Corporate governance mechanisms. 
H4: Unit-Offers will have greater future volatility. 
H5: Share companies will outperform unit companies. 
H6: Unit firms will fail faster and more often than the counter-party. 
 
By way of materialization of the reviewed literature, the above six statements, 
shall be tested in the next chapter by the means of visualization, descriptive analyses and 
regressions. 
The first hypothesis should be tested in concordance with Schultz theory, where he states 
that unit companies are characterized as smaller, risker and younger.  
Moreover, the aftereffect of H2 is one of the key points of this research. Are unit 
companies already well managed or do they suffer with increased agency problems? The 
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answer shall provide additional arguments to the contrast between the two main theories. 
Where, Schultz (1993) defends that unit-companies use the choice offer as a way to 
improve their corporate governance mechanisms. Alternatively Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri (1997) have theoretically shown that units IPOs are already well managed and 
try to distinguish themselves with units' emissions.  
As final conclusion H3, shall be rejected if there are not enough evidences to support 
Schultz (1993) empirical findings. Matching with the previous test, H3 may illustrate a 
bigger picture about the disagrement between the authors. 
H4 intends to test Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) remark that although units' firms are 
not necessarily less valuable, they will be more volatile. Here the position on units is 
theorized as an assurance to investors, a signal of quality. The preposition stands on the 
absence of full market efficiency. 
Furthermore, H5 shall suggest if there’s a pattern of efficiency to each company group. 
Here Schultz (1993) theory quarrel with Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) model, where 
the latter states that unit companies can be as valuable as the counter-party.  
Therefore, H6 is a necessary complement to the latter H4 and H5, where evidences of 
higher fail rates on units companies would provide a substantial agreement with Schultz 
(1993) empirical findings. In his study, the author conclude that share-only companies 
failed more often than unit-offer firms. Three years after the listing 88.9% of equity-only 
companies were no longer listed. Contrasting with 58.8% of the second groups who had 
being delisted from the NASDAQ market. 
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3.2 Methodology 
 
3.2.1 Data 
 
The data collected consists in three main categories: Offering details, Firm 
characteristics and Governance Mechanisms.  
Initially the data was retrieved from Reuters DataStream Deal Screener. Enclosing 
126 unit-IPOs and 1059 share-only IPOs with market capitalizations in NASDAQ or 
NYSE, ranging in the data period between 2007 and 2017. Subsequently, unit trusts and 
real estate companies IPOs were excluded from the sample. Resulting in a final sample 
of 105 units companies. From the share-only IPOs sample, a random selection of 111 
companies was made, where the same treatment of unit trusts and real estate companies 
took place.  
Moreover, due to data constrains, the corporate governance variables were manually 
collected from the company’s prospectus at date of offer, collected from SEC website, 
mostly in form of S1/A submissions. According the registration statement by the 
Securities Act of 1993, the report must provide all the necessary information to ensure an 
educated decision, based on the worthiness of the firm. Other variables such as offering 
details were also collected and adjusted manually. Although some foreign registrations 
were also considered in the analysis, forms F1/A, the majority were from American 
companies.  
Since one of the fundamental purposes of the findings is to categorize the type and 
structure of each company, no market capitalization control took place at the selection of 
the sample. Instead posterior control variables were calculated to assure size control and 
normality. 
Finally, the global data set comprised a total of number of 216 companies confirmed 
deals, varying from different sectors, since tech companies to mining companies. Not 
unexpectedly most companies who followed the emission with units are located in sectors 
such as mining, energy and pharmacy, usually industries with higher volatility of returns.   
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3.2.2 Variables and Introduction to the Methodology 
 
Initially, our dataset was separated into the different types of offering choices, 
Package units and shares-only stocks.  
The first step is to investigate the descriptive statics for each offer type and try to find a 
relevant interpolation about their unique characteristics, tracing a dynamic relationship 
with the literature.  
 
 
The variables selection is crucial to a consistent analysis. As stated by James J 
Heckman (1977), the selection bias may arise when an analysis is grounded on non-
random samples, that often occurs when data is missing for the dependent variable. In 
another words, when the data is very submissive the sample elected is tendentially less 
random.  
In contrast with other problems, as the scarcity of data, on the independent variables, the 
selection bias problem may also crop up at prime levels of the variable itself. Due to the 
awareness to the data limitations on the fundamental levels of this research, we tried to 
mitigate the problem as much as possible. Carefully selecting the variables, prior, the 
model's construction, basing them on the above discussed literature.  
 Bestowing the previous mentioned division, the variables can be breakdown in three 
groups: firms characteristics, offering details and corporate governance mechanisms.  
Firstly, on the firm’s characteristics the analysis will exploit the humble but 
efficient classic valuation ratios. As a proxy to size, the amount of Total Assets was 
Measure  Proxy 
Size 
Total Assets 
Offer Size 
Volatility on Cash Flows  
SIC (Energy) 
Daily Stock Price Change 
Profitability  ROA 
Corporate Governance  
Board Independence  
Board Size 
Total Liabilities to 
EBITDA 
CEO Duality  
Performance 
Survival Status 
Daily Stock Price 
Table 1. Variables Approximations – Source: Own Elaboration 
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elected. The variable is especially relevant to test the argument that companies who chose 
Package offers are in average smaller than share-only firms. Based on Schultz (1993) 
empirical findings, the amount of total assets should be greater to equity-only companies. 
Secondly, as a proxy for profitability, this study selected ROA, vastly used in the 
classical literature, this ratio shall give additional insights about the income generated to 
the shareholders per offer type. Defining the performance of the groups before the first 
sell. The current ratio was also considered, to approximate the possibility that, further 
than smaller and younger these companies are also riskier. According Altman (1968), the 
latter measure is commonly associated with low liquidity levels and consequently lower 
current ratios 
Subsequently to its crucial role in this study, volatility is approximated by multiple 
variables. First, by the daily stock price changes from the time-range of the analysis. 
Therefore, we based our choice in the belief that there is some high degree of efficiency 
in US markets.  
Moreover, as a complement to the volatility measurement, we decided to use a binary 
variable to enclose industries with high volatility in their cash-flows. Whereas, companies 
in industries connected with the production/extraction of energy commodities, shall be 
included in the variable SIC. As per fundamental behaviours, energy stocks look as much 
as Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) definition of unit companies. With a big potential 
for high future cash-flows, they also experience big volatilities as result of their big 
exposition to commodity price changes.   
The offer details were comprised as the offered amount divided by the total assets, 
although this variable seems biased, due to the different asset intensity between sectors, 
we decided that a variable to control size was required. Data was enriched with NASDAQ 
website information's relating the IPO.  
As corporate governance indicators we privileged: board size, number of non-
executives on the board, CEO duality, number of independent members in the board, 
CEO age and a solvency ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
Regarding the board size, as discussed in the previous sections and stated by M. C. Jensen 
(1993), its efficiency as a governance mechanism is negatively correlated with its size. In 
other words, larger boards do a worse job. The bridge with our hypothesis can be stated 
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as the following: If the average board size of unit IPOs companies are larger than share-
only, we have a flag pointing in the direction of Schultz (1993) hypothesis. Contrarily, if 
we found smaller board sizes to unit IPOs, we can trail Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) 
theory. 
Furthermore, M. C. Jensen (1993) also argues to the fundamental role of the number of 
outsiders and their amount of ownership, the board independence and the separation of 
leadership (measured by assessing if a CEO also have the Chairman position). Howe and 
Olsen (2009) also pointed to the level of debt as a variable, since it contains an important 
monitoring role. All the previous variables shall be used to support or disclaim the main 
hypothesis studied in this thesis, painting a wider picture about the real roll of warrants 
in IPOs.  
Finally, basing on the previous literature, we exploited the survival status and the 
daily stock price. The former variable is defined as a dummy variable, where company 
who were listed at the end of December of 2017 were distinct as 1 and delisted companies 
as 0.  
Additionally, the daily stock price will be handoff as an approximation of firms’ 
performance.  
 The next section shall present all the descriptive statistics between units and stock-
only companies. As a first line of comparison, the study will perform a statistic descriptive 
analysis to stablish relationships, equating the offer types means differences. As a first 
instance, it will allow to draw a line between the fundamental firms' characteristics 
connecting them with their respective offering type. 
Next, due the nature of our analysis, with a dichotomous dependent variable, 
where we are defining the type of the offering as Package (with units) or Share-only, a 
Probit model will be applied. Considering a binary model, where our variable can only 
be in two states.  
The goal with the latter analysis is to evaluate the likelihood of any of the two offering 
types to be chosen, conditioned by some independent variables such as the corporate 
governance mechanisms or the fundamentals of the company, we should trace a 
relationship between the findings and the past literature. (more in the 
methodology/models’ section) 
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The preference of a Probit model arrives from the specific questions elevated on our 
hypothesis. According Stone and Rasp (1991), the choice between Logit/ Probit and OLS 
models can be largely debatable. In their research, the authors simulated the procedure of 
both models with binary responsive variables (same as our offer types). The conclusion 
revealed that for samples with more than 200 entries, in fact the logit or Probit models 
can be more efficient. 
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 The collection of the end sample was a result of the data treatment detailed in the 
beginning of this chapter. Organized by a group of 111 companies who went public with 
shares-only and a group of 105 firms who decided to go with Units first Offerings, with 
a total sample size of 216 deals. 
The below table 2 summarizes the main statistics collected and unglued for each offering 
type.  
     
     Mean Group 1 Group 2   
Variable Shares Units Total  
     
     AMOUNT OFFERED  320,149.26  201,757.33  262,597.62  
AMOUNT OFFERED BY TOTAL ASSETS  1.35577  6.01986  3.62303  
BOARD SIZE  11.9099  9.03810  10.5139  
CEO DUALITY  0.29730  0.51429  0.40278  
CURRENT RATIO  0.99045  1.14582  1.06597  
DAYS TRADED  1,198.5225  823.266667  1,016.1065  
DELISTED  0.70270  0.56190  0.63426  
EBITDA  278,082.91  199,511.53  239,888.49  
BOARD INDEPENDENCE  5.42342  3.33333  4.40741  
NUMBER OF NON-EXECUTIVES  5.72973  4.29524  5.03241  
SIC VARIABLE  0.04505  0.60952  0.31944  
TOTAL ASSETS  3,883,926  2,291,584  3,109,871  
TOTAL DEBT TO EBITDA  9.04378  2.59191  5.90745  
TOTAL EQUITY  688,529.77  877,695.52  780,485.35  
TOTAL LIABILITIES  3,195,396  1,413,954  2,329,417  
CEO AGE  51.50450  52.36538  51.92093  
ROA -0.40859 -0.52371 -0.46455  
     
     Standard Deviation     
Variable Shares Units Total  
     
     AMOUNT OFFERED  1,512,111  188,894.4  1,091,148  
AMOUNT OFFERED BY TOTAL ASSETS  6.87646  52.4543  36.8862  
BOARD SIZE  3.42597  2.98691  3.52001  
CEO DUALITY  0.45914  0.50219  0.49160  
CURRENT RATIO  4.18134  4.17576  4.16963  
DAYS TRADED  700.8701  571.3960  666.7786  
DELISTED  0.45914  0.49853  0.48276  
EBITDA  2,201,063  424,508.1  1,602,309  
BOARD INDEPENDENCE  1.89521  1.90983  2.16757  
NUMBER OF NON-EXECUTIVES  2.15721  2.35308  2.36129  
SIC VARIABLE  0.20834  0.49020  0.46734  
TOTAL ASSETS  21,233,700  5,252,026  15,641,512  
TOTAL DEBT TO EBITDA  70.04715  32.49281  55.05912  
TOTAL EQUITY  3,383,462  2,497,251  2,980,371  
TOTAL LIABILITIES  17,981,950  2,952,700  13,055,608  
CEO AGE  7.697548  7.531239  7.611985  
ROA  2.26884  3.55225  2.95649  
     
     Observations  111  105  216  
     
          
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics divided per group offer - Source: Own Elaboration 
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While analysing the above table it’s important to recall that the Shares-only 
sample was selected as a random collection of the total deals with only shares emission.  
It’s possible to assess that the amount offered, number of shares times the offer 
price, in the first group is substantial higher. Nevertheless, when the same value is 
controlled by the firm size proxy, the picture changes sides instantly. It’s now inferable 
that the influence of the latter is somehow significant. Although, this can be explained by 
the asset's intensity of the each of the groups, when we look for the standard deviation of 
units offer size, we may withhold the thought that it doesn’t vary much. However, a 
deeper investigation to the variance of the Total assets and the division between the offer 
size controlled by firm size lead us to some contradictory inferences about the true 
dispersion of the offers.  
First, Units companies appear to be smaller than shares only. With an average of round 
2.3 billion worth of assets, this group is meaningfully minor than the competitor with a 
mean of about 3.9 billion. It’s also interesting to investigate their standard deviation. With 
an astonish difference between the values it can be suggested that the sample includes 
major differences between the individual share's companies.  
Notwithstanding, both samples have a vast number of large z-scores and while the 
standard deviation of amount offered by shares firms seems to run along with their assets 
variance, the same is not happening with the units companies. Resulting in a hefty 
difference in the standard deviation of units' companies. As an interpretation, we can 
presume two scenarios. One, the latter firms try to access to the same amount of capital 
from the primary market overlooking their own size. Thus, signalizing a first hint to 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997), who states that less valuable companies will try to 
mimic their highly deserving competitors. Or, in opposition, units' companies may 
operate in industries where the assets intensity is lower. To get into the root, a oversee of 
the SIC can provide a complementary guidance.  
Furthermore, it’s notable the connection of the previous facts with Schultz (1993) first 
argument. Unit companies, in deed, appear to be smaller than Stock only firms.   
Assigned as a dichotomous independent variable, SIC was assigned as 1 if the 
company is operating in any sector related to the energy sector and 0 if it doesn’t. In the 
 
28 
 
table 2, it’s possible to picture the large difference between the two samples. Around 61% 
of the companies relate to the sector, rivalling with the modest value of 4 % for shares-
only.  
One may argue, that the random selected sample for shares only may fall outside the 
normal distribution of the universe in USA. To mitigate that, a comprehensive analysis 
to that particular variable over the total population of share-only IPOs was conducted as 
per the below table.  
 
Energy SIC for the entire universe of IPOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The findings are very similar to the ones in our small sample. With a mean of 
approximately 6 % of the total IPOs, only 104 companies connected with the energy 
sector 1 ever gone public, with shares only, between 2007 and 2017 in the USA primary 
markets. Equating the 63 corporations who chose unit offerings, it’s fair to say that from 
the total of 167 energy companies, who collected money from the primary market, in the 
period, about 38 % decided to offer units as a complement.  
Due to the volatile nature of the energy sector, driven by commodity prices, one may 
additionally argue that the above results strongly support Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
(1997) predictions. By way of explanation, the latter companies have a peculiar 
characteristic of having higher volatilities in their cash-flows. Coupling with the authors 
                                                          
1 To a broader explanation on the SICs included please refer to the annexes, table number 2. 
Table 3.   Variable Energy SIC - US Universe equity-only offers from 2007 to 2017 - 
Source: Own elaboration 
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model, who states that companies with high valuable cash flows with big standard 
deviations have more incentives to go public with units' offerings. It’s also worth of 
pointing the relation with Schultz (1993) results, unit companies seem to be riskier. 
Although, the corporate governance variables are not so distinctive as the 
previous, it’s possible to distinguish them between the two groups.  
Starting with the board size, in average, share-only firms have bigger boards. With the 
latter having a mean of 12 members per company, compared with 9 members for units' 
firms. There’s also the size factor that must be taken into account. As inferred before, 
share-only companies are larger than the second group. Meaning that they can have bigger 
boards simply as result of their dimension. Furthermore, it’s also central to analyse the 
standard deviation of each offer type. Shares have a superior variance, that leads to a 
congruent conclusion with the previous statement, mainly due to the size differences 
between the samples. 
When it comes to board independence, the results point to a substantial difference of 2 
independent members. Whereas, the conventional offer type has the lead of about 5 
outsiders compared with only 3 for structured offers. Likewise, the aforementioned 
variable, the number of independent members must be interpreted with caution 
considering the dimension of the particular group.  
Additionally, the number of non-executives appears to fluctuate slightly between the sets.  
When evaluating the last two variables, is important to notice that SEC regulations and 
standards, do have a major impact in their outputs. Even though companies have the 
potential to elect any type of board, there are specific lowest that are suggested by the 
entity. 
In the latest, 2016 memo circular nº.19, “Code of Corporate Governance”, SEC defines a 
cluster of recommendations to listed companies. As stated by the entity, these 
recommendations are the core foundations for a healthy governance.  
In the matter that, in the recommendation 5.1, SEC advices that the minimum number of 
independent members, should be at least 3 or in case of large boards 1/3 of the panel size. 
Alongside, the recommendation 5.7 suggests that an increased number of non-executive 
officers can be beneficial to dissect the board performance. 
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Moreover, the recommendation 5.4, SEC states that CEO duality should be avoid. Where, 
the CEO should not exercise the role of Chairman. Despite that, our results suggest that 
the latter recommendation is vastly ignored. With around 51% of units' companies and 
30% of shares-only companies not following it.  
The CEO age doesn’t seem to differ much between sets, with a rounding average of 52 
years for both companies. 
In the matters of total Liabilities, Share-only companies seem to have the lead, 
with a mean value of 3 billion against roughly 1,4 billion from unit-shares. Nonetheless, 
when we measured and control the variable with the earnings there’s a clear picture about 
the engagement of each company type. The latter has now a Total Liabilities to Ebitda 
ratio of around 9.04 against 2.59 from the former. With low volatilities in both cases. 
Jointly with the others Corporate governance mechanisms, it’s possible to infer that 
Share-only companies go into their offers with higher levels of debt. When considering 
the amount of total Liabilities as a proxy of the amount of total Debt, it’s clear that the 
first group have extra exposure to creditors pressure, monitoring and control, coextending 
Schultz (1993) predictions. 
However, when we ponder the ROA, calculated taking the EBITDA divided by 
the total amount of assets, both groups seem to be on negative territory, with close 
averages ranging (-0.41%) and (-0.523), for group 1 and group 2, respectively. In contrast 
with the positive mean EBITDA, these negative values can be simply explained by a 
portion of companies who have a scanty of total assets and hefty negative EBITDAs, 
altering the mean ROA to adverse grounds. 
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3.4 Energy SIC  
 
As a counterparty for the daily stock price change, we attempted to assess the 
influence of sectors connected with Energy SICs with the choice of units offers. To back 
up our choice we back-tested an ETF who tracks the US energy stocks and compared it 
with a SP500 Benchmark.  
 
As per the above image, the volatility on IXC is visibly higher, with the peak 
reaching 2008 financial crisis for both groups. With a clear trend on the unfolding time 
series, the energy SIC standard deviations were always bigger in the past ten years. 
However, it’s also noticeable the high correlation between volatilities, nonetheless 
it’s also important to take in consideration that the diversification of an ETF is always 
lower than the actual SP500 index. To mitigate, this diversification effect, we back-tested 
the correspondent SP500 ETF - SPDR S&P 500. Although, there’s still the factor that 
accounts for the sector diversification on the index, a distinct image can be taken when 
we compare what’s in essence the average volatility for all the sector.  
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. IXC volatility, between 2007 to 2017, when backtested against SP500 Source: Quantopian Platform 
 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above tables summarize the relationship between the two index trackers. In the first 
the energy sector has a beta of 1.18, representing some level of independence with the 
rest of the market. Associated with an annual volatility of 27.6%, the energy stocks were 
almost 8 % more volatile. Although, the effect seems to be intensified on cases of stress2.  
The linkage with the Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) is present. Energy stocks are more 
volatile and at the same time extremely profitable, exactly the scenario described by the 
authors’ models.  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 More details in the annexes, figure 1. 
Table 5. SPY Backtest   Table 4. IXC Backtest  
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3.5 Daily Stock Price 
 
As a main index of volatility for our research, the daily stock price was extracted 
within the pre-defined time window range. Therefore, we retrieved the data from the 
beginning of 2007 to the end of 2017, from the Quantopian platform, who is directly feed 
by Morningstar database.  
The variable is composed by the variation on the stock price between t and t-1. On another 
words, it measures the average daily price changes on the stock price comparing it with 
the previous day. Figure 2 shows the dispersion of the stocks volatility between the years, 
grouped by offer type. 
Although there´s an expected correlation between both groups, the variances are not 
steady for the whole period. Nonetheless, the equity-only group appears to be more 
subjectable to price fluctuation in most of the years. Interestingly, our sample of shares-
only seems to have increase its average in the peak of the financial crisis. A deep analysis 
revealed that in fact the results are attributed to the colossal drop prices in 2008 that 
simply reversed to a near mean in late 2009. Moreover, the amount of companies that 
couldn’t survive the crisis also influenced the jump in the average daily price change. 
Mainly because of the survivorship bias, where delisted companies no longer had 
negative variations on prices.  
 
Figure 2. Annual Average Daily Stock Price per offer Type - Source: Own elaboration 
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Contradicting Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) prediction there’s no evidences 
of higher future volatilities for equity-only companies in their stock-prices. Thus, Schultz 
(1993) main concept of improvement on Corporate Governance may be conceivable in 
the above scenario, where ex-ante worse corporate governance indicators are not 
translated into worse performance. Intrinsically connected with H5, the initial predictions 
point to an environment where share-only companies don’t outperform the counterparty.  
 
 
Figure 3. Annual Cumulative Returns per offer type - Source: Own elaboration 
 
However, when a deep analysis on the cumulative returns takes place, it’s noticeable 
that the performance doesn’t seem to carry along with the daily variance. In fact, the 
evidences point to a general higher performance to the share-only sample.  
The difference is not only graphically observable but empirically meaningful, where unit 
offers had a mean positive return of 13.8%, equated with a 52.1% of mean cumulative 
returns from Shares-only companies. The amount of companies delisted for each group 
is an important flag when assessing the general environment. With 44% of unit companies 
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being delisted at the end of 2017, compared with only 30% of equity-only firms without 
tickers in the main US markets, at the same time.  
Although, both companies' groups have positive returns. The evidences appear to support 
H5, whereas the previous analysis portrays a different picture, where unit-companies 
underperform the competition. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997)  theory, again, loses 
steam when both datasets are set side by side. 
Moreover, the next chapters shall investigate the hypothesis with probabilistic models.  
 
3.6 Methodology and Models 
  
Although the previous sections enlighten our research and pointed for some 
unexpected results, a Probit analysis shall give additional arguments to each of the 
contrast theories and provide a probabilistic test to the aforethought hypotheses.  
Prior-models it’s necessary to assess the level of the correlation between the 
variables. In our study we defined our threshold level of 70% as acceptable to perform a 
Probit analysis, excluding interaction between independent variables with amount greater 
than it, in the same model. Promoting greater expected levels of significance in each 
model, avoiding redundancies.3 
Moreover, the below correlation matrix, noised some associations with three flag points 
above the demarcated value. Starting with the Amount offered and ROA, the correlation 
reaches the 70%. The latter can be explained by the proportionality between size and 
capitalization goals. In another words, bigger companies target bigger amounts from the 
primary market.  
Second there’s evidences of high correlations, between the board size and the number of 
non-executives in the board. As reviewed in the previous chapter, the size of the board is 
intimately connected with the amount of independent member and non-executive officers.  
The same assembly occur with the number of non-executives and independent members, 
whereby definition it should be closer to 100%, nonetheless, when accounting for the 
                                                          
3 For more details refer to annexes, table 2 
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non-executive officer that have connections with the company but do not performing any 
executive position, the correlation decreases to around 80%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When analysing other significant correlations, there´s an interesting negative 
value that calls for attention. The relation between the energy SIC and the independence 
of the board is something to reflect about. At a first glance on the correlation matrix, the 
sector is ostensibly characterized by a positive movement with the performance proxy 
(ROA), a positive relation with the CEO Duality and negative correlation with the board 
independence.  
Furthermore, there’s also two other obvious correlation between ROA and the current 
ratio, where fundamentally the current liabilities are being measured against the 
performance proxy, producing a negative correlation between both. 
In the next section a probabilistic model shall take place, in order measure the relation of 
the above variables and our dependent variable. 
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Figure 4. Correlation Matrix between variables selected - Source: Own elaboration 
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3.6.1 Probit Models 
 
Aligned with the main intention of this study, the application of a Probit model 
aims to find evidences to explain why companies chose to go public with unit emission. 
Moreover, to test the 5 hypotheses rose in the previous chapter.  
 Before the application of the model itself, is important to recall that Probit models 
are atypical when it comes to the results. They measure the probability of a certain output 
conditioning the independent variables. 
In what follows, this study shall model the conditional probability of each company to 
choose a unit emission. By way of explanation, the probability of a company to choose 
to go public, by means of units, is a function of a linear consolidation of the regressors, 
conditional to each one. 
The above probability condition is represented by the equation 1. Where Φ represents the 
cumulative function of the standard normal distribution, again conditional to the 
independent variables. 
𝒫[𝑌𝑖 = 1 | 𝑋1𝑖, … 𝑋𝑁𝑖 ,  𝛽0, . . , 𝛽𝑁] =  Φ(𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑖)
𝑁
𝑛=1    Equation 1 
 
The equation 2, show the linear combination between the regressor and the dependent 
variable. 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑋𝛽 +  𝜀𝑖;                     (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁)   Equation 2 
Where Yi is defined as    𝑌𝑖 = {
1
0
        
When evaluating a Probit model, is important to recall that the interpretation of the 
coefficients should be carefully swotted. In opposition of a linear model, where the 
mean of the dependent variable can be interpreted as the linear combination of the 
regressors. The same is not applied to these probabilistic unit models. Probit models 
work in a different fashion, making the slopes to the mean, a more efficient way to read 
the impact of each variable in the binary output. 
According Carmeron and Triveda (2010), the slopes to the mean, similarly known as the 
marginal effects, are the changing in the probability of the dependent variable, when we 
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change each individual variable to one unit while holding all the other variables at their 
means. In another words, it’s a measurement of the impact that each independent 
variable has in the binary output, given by the probability of the change on the 
dependent variable when, separately, the mean of each variable is changed to 1 and 0. 
 
𝑌∗ = 𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑋1 +  𝛽𝑋2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖 +  𝜀      Equation 3.1 
 
𝑌∗ = 𝛽0 +  𝛽 ∗ 1 +  𝛽𝑋2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖 +  𝜀     Equation 3.2 
 
𝒫0 =
𝑒𝑌
∗
1+𝑒𝑌
∗         Equation 3.3 
 
𝑌∗ = 𝛽0 +  𝛽 ∗ 0 +  𝛽𝑋2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖 +  𝜀     Equation 3.4 
 
𝒫1 =
𝑒𝑌
∗
1+𝑒𝑌
∗         Equation 3.5 
 
𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑋1 = 𝒫1 − 𝒫0       Equation 3.6 
 
From the original equation 3.1, there’s a transformation in the independent variable mean 
to a binary state, in the equation 3.2 and 3.4. Subsequently a reduction from the 
logarithmic preposition to a probability in equations 3.3 and 3.5.    
 Resulting in a final step to differentiate both states, giving the final slope to the 
mean to the variable X1. Meaning that its value will represent the probability of sate 
change to the dependent variable by 1 unit of change in X1. It’s important to denote, that 
a negative slope doesn't translate a negative probability, but in contrast, signify the 
probability to alteration to state 0. 
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3.6.2 Models and conclusions 
 
In this section, different models shall be analysed, testing the multiple hypothesis. It’s 
worth to mention that all the below regressions were calculated with robust QML4 
standard errors. 
 
Model 1.1 – General Model: Firm Characteristics and CG mechanisms 
 
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂 +  𝛽𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑂𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 + 𝛽𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸
+  𝛽𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +  𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 +  𝛽𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸
+ 𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽𝑆𝐼𝐶 +  𝜀 
          Equation 4 
       
Model 1.1: Probit, using observations 1-216 
Dependent 
variable: Offer 
Type5 
Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
z Slope* p-value  
Constant 0.695832 0.843944 0.8245   0.4097   
Current Ratio −0.100924 0.0729177 −1.384 −0.039691 0.1663   
Total Liabilities to 
EBITDA 
−0.00171042 0.00184769 −0.9257 −0.000672 0.3546 
  
Amount offered by 
totalassets 
0.0505206 0.0417729 1.209 0.0198689 0.2265 
  
Board size −0.100195 0.0419039 −2.391 −0.039405 0.0168 ** 
CEO Duality 0.391872 0.234389 1.672 0.152084 0.0945 * 
Board Independence −0.173118 0.0685002 −2.527 −0.068084 0.0115 ** 
CEOAge 0.00827320 0.0150509 0.5497 0.00325371 0.5825   
SIC Variable 1.99252 0.285730 6.973 0.616290 <0.0001 *** 
              
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 176 (81.5%) 
f(beta'x) at mean of independent vars = 0.393 
Likelihood ratio test: Chi-Square (8) = 132.484 [0.0000] 
 
Mean 
dependent 
var 
McFadden 
R-squared 
Log-
likelihood 
Schwarz 
criterion 
S.D. 
dependent 
var 
Adjusted 
R-
squared 
Akaike 
criterion 
Hannan-
Quinn 
 0.486111  0.442686 −83.394  215.1664  0.500968  0.382541  184.7888 
 
197.0614 
Table 6. Multilevel dimensional Binary Probit analysis – Levels of significance: *** 1% ** 5% * 10% 
Table 4 measures the assertiveness of offer choice conditioned by the Firm Characteristic 
and Corporate Governance variable.  
 
                                                          
4 Quasimaximum likelihood 
5 The dichotomous variable has a state equal to 1 for units offers and 0 for equity-only offers  
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After completing the probabilistic analysis, the results pointed out to an Adjusted 
R-Squared of around 38%, with 81.5% of the offer types correctly predicted. Herewith, 
showing some level of significance. 
Moreover, the above equation outcome four significant variables. The SIC variable with 
the greatest level of significance, the board independence with a significance level of 
around 1.2%, the Board Size with a p-value rounding 1.7% and finally CEO duality with 
a value near 9.5%.  
Although, it’s observable that Current Ratio and Total liabilities by Total Assets 
have a negative influence, along with the positive effect of Offer Size and CEO age, 
neither of the two groups exhibited enough significance in the analysis. Implicating a 
small role in the offer choice. Nonetheless, the signal appears to be in line with Schultz 
(1993) prediction about the negative relation between risk and the choice of units, before 
offer. Whereas, our first proxy of risk, the current ratio, has a negative impact on the offer 
choice. In another words, the decrease of the current ratio, reflecting less liquidity, will 
increase the probability of units choice.  
Undertaking the assumption that we established an alpha to a maximum of 10% of 
significance, the CEO duality becomes a mark to understand the formation of our offer 
choice. The results show that CEO duality explaining up to a 15.2% of probability of 
change on offer choice, per unit of change. In simple words, the greater the CEO Duality 
the greater the probability that a company will embrace a unit offer. Signalling again, a 
connection with Schultz (1993) theory, where the evidences show that the increase of a 
weak governance mechanism, CEO duality, will produce a growth on the probability of 
a package IPO. 
Furthermore, aligned with the analysis on the descriptive statistics, the evidences show a 
negative relation between unit offers and Board Size. The interconnection is discernible, 
where a slope of around -4% represents an inverse relationship. In other words, the 
increase of one member in the board will conjointly increase the probability of state 0, 
equity-only offers. 
Following with Board independence, the model illustrates evidences of an 
opposing behaviour between board independence and unit choice. The increment of one 
independent member, in the board, would be reflected as a rounding 7% increment of 
probably of an equity-only offer. 
Lastly, SIC appears to be the most significant variable, with an astonish value of about 
62% impact. Despite the fact, dummy variables always have larger slopes, due to their 
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intrinsically binary properties, the level of significance and influence still have the most 
substantial explanatory power in the equation. 
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Model 1.2 - General Model: Firm Characteristics and CG mechanisms (Optimized) 
 
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂 + 𝛽𝑅𝑂𝐴 +  𝛽𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +  𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌
+  𝛽𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸 + 𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽𝑆𝐼𝐶 +  𝜀 
 
Model 1.2: Probit, using observations 1-216 
Dependent 
variable: Offer 
Type 
Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
z Slope* p-value  
Constant 0.741356 0.844209 0.8782   0.3799   
Boardsize −0.105265 0.0423231 −2.487 −0.0418901 0.0129 ** 
Current Ratio −0.0916244 0.0533207 −1.718 −0.0364618 0.0857 * 
CEO Duality 0.394245 0.234789 1.679 0.155355 0.0931 * 
CEOAge 0.00816116 0.0151558 0.5385 0.00324772 0.5902   
SIC Variable 2.01701 0.289445 6.969 0.642443 3.20e-012 *** 
Board Independence −0.173694 0.0690914 −2.514 −0.0691212 0.0119 ** 
ROA −0.154945 0.0886593 −1.748 −0.0616599 0.0805 * 
              
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 177 (81.9%) 
f(beta'x) at mean of independent vars = 0.398 
Likelihood ratio test: Chi-Square (7) = 132.255 [0.0000] 
 
Mean 
dependent 
var 
McFadden 
R-squared 
Log-
likelihood 
Schwarz 
criterion 
S.D. 
dependent 
var 
Adjusted 
R-
squared 
Akaike 
criterion 
Hannan-
Quinn 
0.486111 0.441921 −83.50900 210.0202  0.500968 0.388458 183.0180 193.9270 
 
 
While optimizing the assessment, with the replacement of Offer Size for ROA, 
the results presented similar outcomes, with the number of cases ‘correctly predicted’ 
increased by one and a slightly larger R-Squared. In addition, ROA and Current Ratio 
showed as significant.  
In fact, the previous statement imposes a more comprehensive connotation. With negative 
slopes, there’re two crucial inferences connected with H1.  
First, with an influence of around 3.6 % per each unit of change, the model 1.1 suggests 
that an increase in the Current Ratio6 will produce an increased probability of equity-only 
choice. Substantiating Schultz (1993) statement about unit-offers being risker.  
                                                          
6 An increase on Current Ratio implies less risk  (𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 / 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 ) 
 
Table 7. Multilevel dimensional Binary Probit analysis – Levels of significance: *** 1% ** 5% * 10% 
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Furthermore, ROA also displays a negative relationship with offer type, with a 6% 
increased probability of going public with share-only offers per each unit of change of 
ROA. Therefore, screening evidences for the second leg of H1.7 
 The above model shows strong evidences that H1 cannot be rejected. Aligning itself with 
previous empirical finding from Zhang (2010), Howe and Olsen (2009) and How et al. 
(2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Optimized models can be found on table 4 of the annexes. 
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Model 2 - General Model: Firm Characteristics, CG mechanisms and volatility 
 
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂 +  𝛽𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +  𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 +
 𝛽𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸 + 𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽𝑅𝑂𝐴 +
 𝛽𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐼𝐿𝑌𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 +  𝜀   
          Equation 5 
Model 2: Probit, using observations 1-216 
Dependent 
variable: Offer 
Type 
Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
z Slope* p-value  
Constant 0.00776551 0.779831 0.009958   0.9921   
Board size −0.0461221 0.0371713 −1.241 −0.0180102 0.2147   
Current Ratio 0.608809 0.287719 2.116 0.237733 0.0343 ** 
CEO Duality 0.544307 0.208837 2.606 0.212129 0.0092 *** 
CEO Age 0.0188680 0.0126243 1.495 0.00736775 0.1350   
Board Independence −0.271577 0.0780633 −3.479 −0.106048 0.0005 *** 
ROA 0.213416 0.201445 1.059 0.0833363 0.2894   
Voltility −0.584317 0.306848 −1.904 −0.228169 0.0569 * 
              
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 147 (77.8%) 
f(beta'x) at mean of independent vars = 0.390 
Likelihood ratio test: Chi-Square (7) = 66.3818 [0.0000] 
 
 
Although, this study was conducted with the possibility of a potential lookahead 
bias, by means of the utilization of the annualized average Daily Volatility of the stocks. 
The main goal is to test the future volatility of the cash flows in the choice offer. As 
described in Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997)  theoretical scenario, unit-firms have more 
volatile expected future cash-flows.  
Interestingly, volatility appears to be significant and inversely to unit-offers. The 
relationship seems negative, with a probability of change of around 22.8 % probability 
Table 8. Multilevel dimensional Binary Probit analysis – Levels of significance: *** 1% ** 5% * 10% 
Mean 
dependent 
var 
McFadden 
R-squared 
Log-
likelihood 
Schwarz 
criterion 
S.D. 
dependent 
var 
Adjusted 
R-
squared 
Akaike 
criterion 
Hannan-
Quinn 
0.433862 0.256604 −96.15563 234.2452 0.496923 0.194755 208.3113 218.8177 
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change. Thus, for each unitary change on the annualized volatility, there is an incremented 
probability that companies choose equity-offers.  
The evidences don’t support H4, instead, they point to Schultz theory who proposes that 
units are used as a Corporate Governance mechanism.   
It’s also noticeable the significance of each Corporate Governance on the model, whereas 
Board Independence, CEO Duality and Current Ratio are all worth to mention.  
Nonetheless, when it comes to explanatory power, this model loses steam, with an R-
Squared of about 19%. 
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Model 3 - General Model: CG mechanisms 
 
 
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 =  𝛽0 +   𝛽𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +  𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 +  𝛽𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸 +
𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝐺𝐸 +  𝜀  
          Equation 6 
Model 3: Probit, using observations 1-216 
Dependent 
variable: Offer 
Type 
Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
z Slope* p-value  
Constant 0.822802 0.729492 1.128   0.2594   
CEO Age 0.0148093 0.0121296 1.221 0.00590078 0.2221   
Independence −0.246895 0.0684002 −3.610 −0.0983755 0.0003 *** 
CEO Duality 0.518087 0.195393 2.652 0.204398 0.0080 *** 
Boardsize −0.0725335 0.0353100 −2.054 −0.0289011 0.0400 ** 
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 163 (75.5%) 
f(beta'x) at mean of independent vars = 0.398 
Likelihood ratio test: Chi-Square (4) = 67.9785 [0.0000] 
 
 
 
When we tested the explanatory power of the Corporate Governance mechanisms, 
we found evidences similar to model 2. Although the model has a lower R-Squared, due 
to regressors omission. It can be useful, to observe the marginal effect, where the 
coefficients dispersions are lower. 
 The evidences show, high levels of significance found in Board Independence, CEO 
Duality and Board Size. It’s also worth to mention, that the Corporate Governance 
mechanism by itself have an Adjusted R-Squares of about 19.4%, explaining a big 
quantity of the model.  
Moreover, the increase of one independent member in the board will increase the 
probability of equity-offers, likewise the effect in the board size has the same effect but 
in a smaller scale. An important point to be remark is the relation between both variables, 
Mean 
dependent 
var 
McFadden 
R-squared 
Log-
likelihood 
Schwarz 
criterion 
S.D. 
dependent 
var 
Adjusted 
R-
squared 
Akaike 
criterion 
Hannan-
Quinn 
 0.486111 0.227145 −115.6472 258.1708  0.500968 0.193731 241.2944 248.1125 
Table 9. Multilevel dimensional Binary Probit analysis – Levels of significance: *** 1% ** 5% * 10% 
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the impact of the increase of the board size on the decision is closely connected with the 
type of member that its being include. As the reviewed literature exhibited, Board Size 
increases can be beneficial to the firm CG specially if the member is an outsider. 
Finally, CEO Duality is once again positively connected with the choice of Unit-IPOs. 
Whereas, the probability of alteration rounds 20.4% if the CEO also play the Chairman 
figure. 
The above model displayed several indications in favour of H2 and H3, where lower CG 
factors are in concordance with the emission of units.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Model 4 - General Model: Volatility 
 
 
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 =  𝛽0 +   𝛽𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐼𝐿𝑌𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 +  𝛽𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝐷 +  𝛽𝑆𝐼𝐶 +  𝜀
  
          Equation 7 
Model 4: Probit, using observations 1-216 
Dependent 
variable: Offer 
Type 
Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
z Slope* p-value  
Constant −0.166331 0.254597 −0.6533   0.5136   
Annualized Daily 
Volatility 
−0.235795 0.247300 −0.9535 −0.0932095 0.3403 
  
Days Traded −0.000632528 0.0002113 −2.994 −0.00025004 0.0028 *** 
SIC  2.37942 0.271751 8.756 0.748491 2.03e-018 *** 
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 160 (84.7%) 
f(beta'x) at mean of independent vars = 0.395 
Likelihood ratio test: Chi-Square (3) = 108.866 [0.0000] 
 
 
The model 4, shall present a complete analysis on all the volatility proxies, while 
not presenting the full explanatory behaviour and already tested in model 2, the above 
model intends to clarify the role of volatility. Although it includes the number of trading 
day, another serious lookahead variable, the aim is to measure the influence of volatility 
in the offer choice.  
It’s crucial to review two main assumption: First, Energy SICs are being used an 
approximation of a company type described in Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) model, 
highly volatility and profitable. Second, the volumes of trading days define the maturity 
and consolidates the market sentiment about a stock, making it proportionally less 
volatile8. 
                                                          
8 No outiers or sensitive information releases are being considered 
Mean 
dependent 
var 
McFadden 
R-squared 
Log-
likelihood 
Schwarz 
criterion 
S.D. 
dependent 
var 
Adjusted 
R-
squared 
Akaike 
criterion 
Hannan-
Quinn 
0.433862 0.420832 −74.91330 170.7936 0.496923 0.389908 157.8266 163.0798 
Table 10. Multilevel dimensional Binary Probit analysis – Levels of significance: *** 1% ** 5% * 10% 
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In consideration with the above model, the annualized volatility now shows low levels of 
significance with a p-value of around 34%, crossing the alpha barrier of 10%.  
 On the other hand, the volume of trading days and the SIC variable express high levels 
of implication, both, with p-values underneath 1%. Remarkably, together they yield a 
model with an R-Squared of around 39 % and with a rate of predictable cases of 84.7%. 
Weighting their impact, the increase on the volume of days trading, translates itself in a 
higher probability of equity-only emission. With an increased probability of 2 basis 
points. Even though, the value is very low, it’s important to notice that the increase of one 
trading day in a panoply of 10 trading years is trading is arguably modest.  
Moreover, the SIC shows similar results as the previous model 1. With a marginal effect 
of 74%. The value must be interpreted with caution, since the variable has dummy 
properties and a slope to the mean can’t be translate as a continuous change to its mean. 
However, its presence and relevance are unquestionable. As well as the positive relation 
with unit-IPOs.  
As a matter of fact, the former statement can be explored in detailed if we drop the 
assumption that Energy SICs are a proxy for volatility and alternatively reasoning its own 
identity as an independent factor. However, that analysis is currently out of the scope of 
this thesis and it’s unspoilt to future investigations. 
Back on topic, the model offers a supplementary view about two contradictory variables. 
In one side, the increase of SIC that appears to explain a great amount of the offer choice, 
on the other hand, our measures of volatility that seem to have a negative relationship 
with the unit's choice. 
As a humble explanation, we can ponder that although the energy sector has high 
volatility on its future expected cash flows, doesn’t mean that they cannot hedge them, 
with an efficient management style.  
In the previous scenario, we can consider the SIC as a predictor of volatility and the 
amount of trading days and daily volatility as the realization. 
However, the arguments contradict H4, once more. 
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3.6.3 Failing rate  
 
A final analysis on distribution of the IPO dates and the failing ratios, presented some 
contradictory evidences.   
The results exhibited a percentage of 44% unit offers, against 30 % of Share-only delisted.  
As a per below visualization, on the distribution of companies’ listings, it’s possible to 
infer two several points: 
First, the environment for both types of initial public offers seems to have 
improved, since the 2008 financial crisis. Not only the total amount of offers increased 
after 2010, but their average life span was also enlarged. Both groups appear to be 
relishing on the high positive market time.  
Nonetheless, when a closer look on the downwards side is given, the evidences displayed 
that units IPOs were close to zero near the recession, raising questions on their existence 
and utility on bear market conditions.  
Second, H6 appears to be on track with the results. Whereas, unit IPO fail, in 
average, in a superior percentage than equity-only IPOs.   
Nonetheless, when we include the falling rate as a binary variable in our models.9 It 
doesn’t seem to increase the explanatory power of the model or be significant as per se.  
 
Figure 5. Companies distributions by year - Source: Own elaboration. 
                                                          
9 Refer to Model 5, in the annexes, table 4. 
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Chapter 4 
 
IV Conclusions 
 
 
This research endeavour to connect a point of agreement between two 
fundamental theories about Unit-IPOs. From one side, the Agency Cost Theory, that 
describes the aforementioned form of capitalization, as a substitution of other Corporate 
Governance mechanisms. Distinctly, the Signalling Theory suggests a setting where Units 
companies are already well managed and adopt this offer type as an approach to 
noteworthy their quality. 
Sequentially, to find empirical indications on the matter the thesis was broke down into 
four main branches. 
First, the spotlight was directed to the firm characteristics and the environment ex-
ante public offer. With a descriptive analysis followed by an application of a probabilistic 
model, Probit. This research found strong indications that companies who emit Unit-IPOs 
are smaller and riskier.  
Harmoniously in concordance with the previous literature, the findings were not 
unexpected. Ipso facto, both the classic theories cemented their foundations in that belief. 
Second, this study examined the implications of each Corporate Governance 
mechanism in the company offer choice. As predicted by the Agency Cost Theory, the 
evidences suggested that Unit firms have weaker mechanisms in practice, nonetheless 
they don’t appear to be outperformed by equity-only companies. Hence, enhancing 
preceding findings about the main assumption that Units can act as corporate governance 
tools.  
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Third, volatility. Prevailing as a key principle to understand the incentives of unit 
offers. The analysis shaped two stages. Initially, we proceed to the analysis of the stock 
prices daily volatility. Whereas, the results displayed weak links with the framework 
proposed by the Signalling theory. Furthermore, the Probit analysis stretched the same 
conclusion. 
Interestingly, although the Energy SIC was employed to mimic the latter theory and 
variable, it revealed an astonishing association with Unit offers. One inference may be 
the relation with the Agency Cost Theory instead. Where companies, after offer, seem to 
have polished their management styles. Allowing them to hedge the initial adverse 
conditions. 
Comparable, with the monitoring pressure from the debtholders and the staged finance 
prearranged by Venture Capitalists, units may act in the same style. When we consider 
that the company can only realize its full potential market capitalization if the warrants 
are exercised. It’s logical to reason that managers have large incentives to perform at their 
highest. 
Lastly, the analysis on the performance and survival rates of each group, revealed 
that although unit offers have been historically less resilient than the competitor set. With 
a clear underperformance when equated against equity-only companies. Nevertheless, the 
difference didn’t seem to be relevant when accounting its explanatory power on the offer 
choice. 
Summarizing, the research found strong indications that both theories have solid 
arguments when assessing the causality of such offer types. Although, Schultz (1993) 
Agency Cost Theory was undoubtedly in line with most of our findings. The Signalling 
Theory was also extant in the results, with the relation between the Energy SIC and the 
choice of units.  
Moreover, the effect of other external factors elusive to this study and the current 
literature, may still be a strong possibility. 
4.1 Limitations 
 
As a common problematic topic rose by several authors, such as How (2001) and 
Zhang (2010). The data limitations, due to the small amount of Unit IPOs, can have 
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compromised the significance levels of our models. Not only the sample size, has 
extremely low, but the classifications of such offers are submissive on most databases, 
leading to a manual correction process.    
Furthermore, the models had high estimated errors, that opens the doors for the possibility 
of different variables as explanatory of the offer choice. Foremost, the size proxy could 
have been different and differently adjusted to the company’s assets intensity. The 
Corporate Governance approximations could also have been chosen differently, including 
variables such as the board tier systems. 
4.2 Extensions for future research 
 
Amidst the several possibilities to the continuity of the units offer study. The most 
glistening is the explanatory power of the energy SIC in the offer choice. A 
comprehensive analysis on the topic may be interesting to explain this not so common 
issues. 
Moreover, as itemized in the previous chapter, the relation and utility of unit-offers 
appears to be submissive in bear markets, such as the 2008 financial crisis. Probing the 
latter, can provide additional evidences to the literature.  
Lastly, the scarcity of data may be overcome if the future study includes Seasoned 
offers. Although, it can compromise the validation of Schultz (1993) theory, its analysis 
can prove to be helpful to understand the mechanisms that rule the units offer choice.  As 
pointed by Byoun (2004), unit seasoned equity offerings can provide a wider spectrum of 
information. There are two points that make USEOs very useful to the research: 
Firstly, Unit IPOs are in essence IPOs, meaning that their time in the market is null, 
entangling the minimum information required by the regulator. Even though the 
availability of such information should be totally released, there are not yet analysts 
following the companies making the information very difficult to access.  
Secondly, these categories of IPOs are decreasing, both types of offerings are currently 
in extinction. Meaning that there are less offerings to analyse.  
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V Appendix 
 
 
5.1 SIC explanation 
 
SIC 
Energy 
Natural Gas Transmission 
Petroleum Bulk Stations And Terminals 
Coal Mining Services 
Crude Petroleum And Natural Gas 
Cogeneration, Alternative Energy Sources 
Bituminous Coal And Lignite Surface Mining 
Petroleum Refining 
Oil And Gas Field Services, Not Elsewhere Classified 
Marine Cargo Handling 
Petroleum And Petroleum Products Wholesalers, Except Bulk Stations And 
Terminals 
Miscellaneous Non-metallic Minerals, Except Fuels 
Deep Sea Domestic Transportation Of Freight 
Products Of Petroleum And Coal, Not Elsewhere Classified 
Deep Sea Foreign Transportation Of Freight 
Electric Services 
Natural Gas Transmission And Distribution 
Pipelines, Not Elsewhere Classified 
Crude Petroleum Pipelines 
Drilling Oil And Gas Wells 
Fuel Oil Dealers 
Table 1. All the above Keywords were chosen to build the variable Energy SIC – Source: Own elaboration 
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5.2 Energy SIC proxy on Stress events  
 
 
 
Figure 1. IXC on Stress Events - Source: Quantopian Platform 
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5.3 Correlations 
 
 
Correlation coefficients, using the observations 1 - 216 
 
CurrentRatio ROA TotalDebttoEB
ITDA 
Amountoffered
bytotalassets 
Boardsize  
1.0000 -0.3056 0.0622 0.1684 0.0147 CurrentRatio 
 1.0000 0.0299 -0.7333 -0.1088 ROA 
  1.0000 -0.0421 0.0289 TotalDebttoEB
ITDA 
   1.0000 0.0972 Amountoffered
bytotalassets 
    1.0000 Boardsize 
      
Numberofnone
xecutives 
CEOandChair
man 
Independentme
mbersontheboa
r 
CEOAge SICVariable  
-0.0373 -0.0552 -0.0576 -0.0725 -0.0274 CurrentRatio 
-0.1042 0.0752 -0.0716 0.1505 0.1594 ROA 
0.0256 -0.0409 0.0143 0.0633 0.0212 TotalDebttoEB
ITDA 
0.0886 -0.0991 0.0634 -0.0908 -0.1193 Amountoffered
bytotalassets 
0.7261 -0.0145 0.6478 0.0040 -0.2022 Boardsize 
1.0000 0.0224 0.8181 0.0618 -0.1701 Numberofnone
xecutives 
 1.0000 -0.0871 0.0572 0.2165 CEOandChair
man 
  1.0000 0.0672 -0.3392 Independentme
mbersontheboa
r 
   1.0000 0.0726 CEOAge 
    1.0000 SICVariable 
      
  Delisted Daystraded DailyVolatility  
  -0.0254 0.0334 -0.2035 CurrentRatio 
  0.0554 -0.0143 0.1474 ROA 
  -0.0179 0.0101 0.0152 TotalDebttoEB
ITDA 
  -0.1465 0.0371 -0.1108 Amountoffered
bytotalassets 
  -0.0266 0.0066 0.0949 Boardsize 
  0.0922 -0.0428 0.0626 Numberofnone
xecutives 
  0.0154 -0.0188 0.0742 CEOandChair
man 
  0.1031 0.0148 0.0942 Independentme
mbersontheboa
r 
  0.0715 -0.1567 -0.0165 CEOAge 
  -0.1247 -0.0081 -0.0519 SICVariable 
  1.0000 0.1572 0.1799 Delisted 
   1.0000 0.0661 Daystraded 
    1.0000 DailyVolatility 
Table 2. Correlations table - Source: Own elaboration 
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5.4 Optimized models 
Model 1.3 - General Model Optimized 
 
Model 1.3: Probit, using observations 1-216 
Dependent 
variable: Offer 
Type 
Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
z Slope* p-value  
Constant  0.300472 0.474007 0.6339   0.5261   
Boardsize −0.0811808 0.0459884 −1.765 −0.0320230 0.0775 * 
Current Ratio 0.740940 0.323657 2.289 0.292275 0.0221 ** 
CEO Duality  0.405935 0.258225 1.572 0.159911 0.1159   
Board 
Independence 
−0.202598 0.0741948 −2.731 −0.0799177 0.0063 
*** 
ROA 0.0283388 0.139001 0.2039 0.0111787 0.8385   
SIC Variable 2.23965 0.311197 7.197 0.724150 
6.16e-
013 *** 
Volatility −2.70469 4.67656 −0.5784 −1.06691 0.5630   
              
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 163 (86.2%) 
f(beta'x) at mean of independent vars = 0.394 
Likelihood ratio test: Chi-Square (7) = 133.877 [0.0000] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
dependent 
var 
McFadden 
R-squared 
Log-
likelihood 
Schwarz 
criterion 
S.D. 
dependent 
var 
Adjusted 
R-
squared 
Akaike 
criterion 
Hannan-
Quinn 
0.433862 0.517513 −62.40798 166.7499 0.496923 0.455664 140.8160 151.3224 
Table 3.  Multilevel dimensional Binary Probit analysis – Levels of significance: *** 1% ** 5% * 10% 
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Model 5 – Introduction of a Delisted variable 
 
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂 + 𝛽𝑅𝑂𝐴 +  𝛽𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +  𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌
+  𝛽𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸 + 𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽𝑅𝑂𝐴
+  𝛽𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐼𝐿𝑌𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 + 𝛽𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 +   𝜀 
 
Model 5: Probit, using observations 1-216 
Dependent 
variable: Offer 
Type 
Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
z Slope* p-value  
const 0.779512 0.851753 0.9152   0.3601   
Current Ratio −0.0894248 0.0504924 −1.771   0.0766 * 
ROA −0.142681 0.0804486 −1.774   0.0761 * 
Board Size −0.102442 0.0422817 −2.423   0.0154 ** 
CEO Duality 0.417195 0.237017 1.760   0.0784 * 
Board Independence −0.171933 0.0695323 −2.473   0.0134 ** 
CEO Age 0.0102326 0.0152823 0.6696   0.5031   
SIC Variable 2.00484 0.294602 6.805   
1.01e-
011 *** 
Delisted −0.283104 0.236543 −1.197   0.2314   
              
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 176 (81.5%) 
f(beta'x) at mean of independent vars = 0.398 
Likelihood ratio test: Chi-square(8) = 133.65 [0.0000] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
dependent 
var 
McFadden 
R-squared 
Log-
likelihood 
Schwarz 
criterion 
S.D. 
dependent 
var 
Adjusted 
R-
squared 
Akaike 
criterion 
Hannan-
Quinn 
0.486111 0.446582 −82.81152 214.0005 0.500968 0.386436 183.6230 195.8956 
Table 4. Multilevel dimensional Binary Probit analysis – Levels of significance: *** 1% ** 5% * 10% 
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5.5 Daily Price Distibutions  
 
 
Figure 2. Share-only companies daily price change frquencies by company - Source: Own elaboration 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Share-only companies daily price change frquencies by company - Source: Own elaboration 
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